Vancouver interim spousal support lawyer Lorne MacLean, QC heads our highly rated and experienced team of BC family lawyers. With 4 offices located across British Columbia, the Vancouver interim spousal support lawyers of MacLean Law focus on applying for and defending against Vancouver interim spousal support claims that focus on medium to ultra high net worth and income cases. Call our Vancouver interim spousal support lawyers now at 604-602-9000.
Our Vancouver interim spousal support team deals with complex international income cases, discovering hidden income cases and ensuring tax free income is properly grossed up to ensure a fair award of Vancouver interim spousal support. We regularly deal with Vancouver interim spousal support:
- involving separation or marriage agreements
- involving entitlement issues
- involving arguments over attribution of income to the payor a recipient cases
- involving the proper application of the custodial payor formula, split custody formula and shared custody formula under the SSAG
- involving re-partnering and remarriage issues
- involving high net worth assets and how it affects interim support
- involving incomes over $350,000
- involving grey divorce interim spousal support
- involving high net worth to ultra high net worth and international income cases
How Does Vancouver Interim Spousal Support Work?
In I.F. v. R.J.R. Madam Justice Ballance provided a tight summary of what Vancouver interim spousal support is and when and how Vancouver interim spousal support is to be awarded before trial:
[122] The main purpose of an interim order for spousal support is to bridge the period between when the action is commenced and the trial at which time the court will be in a position to make a decision on the merits: D.R.M. v. R. B.M., 2006 BCSC 1921; Goriuk v Turton, 2011 BCSC 652.
[123] Because interim orders are summary in nature and temporary, they provide a rough justice at best: Newson v. Newson, 65 B.C.L.R. (3rd) 22 (C.A.) at para. 11. The “rough justice” approach underlying the temporary order implicitly recognizes that the evidence before the chambers judge on the interim application is often insufficient to permit an in-depth analysis of the wide array of factors relevant to entitlement and quantum of support: R.C.G. v. C.L.G., 2010 BCSC 1596, para. 11; Johnson v Johnson, [1993] B.C.J. No. 2140 at 16.
[124] The legal test governing interim support is not necessarily the same as the test applicable in reaching the final order: Goriuk. This is because the full picture of many of the considerations under the applicable legislation will not be known until a fulsome inquiry on the merits is embarked upon a trial.
[125] Relying on Newson, Goriuk confirmed that where the marriage is admitted and need is proved interim support should be ordered without adjudicating the issues, unless the action is frivolous or vexatious.
[126] While the other relevant factors that inform the issue of spousal support are to be considered to the extent possible, the respective needs and means of the parties are ordinarily the central factors, if not the most prominent, on an interim application. The corollary is that considerations such as compensatory factors and the need to achieve self-sufficiency often hold less significance: R.C.J. v. C.L.G., 2010 BCSC 1596 at para. 11; Goriuk at para. 33.
[127] In Goriuk, MacKenzie J. (as she then was) refers to the discussion of this principle by the Court of Appeal in Loesch v. Walji, 2008 BCCA 214 at paras. 19-20,where it cited Traber v. Traber, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2195, 82 A.C.W.S. (3d) 744 :
[5] Mrs. Traber argues that an interim order should take the following three criteria into account:
(1) needs;
(2) ability to pay or means;
(3) presumptive claim to an equal standard of living subject to an equal sharing of the consequences of the dissolution of the marriage.
The final criteria stems from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Moge v. Moge (1992), 43 R.F.L. (3d) 345, and is a relevant factor on applications for interim spousal support: Carr v. Carr (1993), 46 R.F.L. (3d) 326 (B.C.S.C.) and Myers v. Myers [1996] B.C.J. No. 6805, Cranbrook Registry (B.C.S.C.). However, the extent to which the “equal standard of living” criteria, or any other factor found in s. 15(7) of the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) influences the amount of interim support will depend on the nature, extent and reliability of the evidence. It must be remembered that interim applications are based on affidavit evidence that is often conflicting and incomplete. Here, it is too early to fully address all the economic advantages or disadvantages arising from the marriage or its breakdown. It is also too early to fully determine whether Mrs. Traber is able to work full-time and achieve economic self-sufficiency. Accordingly, in spite of all factors being relevant, the evidence as to means and needs is more complete at this stage than the evidence respecting other factors. The difficulty this presents on an application for interim support was recognized in two authorities not referred to by counsel: Johnson v. Johnson, [1993] B.C.J. No. 2140, New Westminster Registry No. D031650 and Short v. Short (1996), 21 R.F.L. (4th) 429 (B.C.S.C.).
Thus, the central factors that are usually to be considered on an interim application for either child or spousal support are the means or ability to pay support, and the needs of the spouse and children.
[Emphasis added]
[128] In Martin v. Martin, 2013 BCCA 327, the Court of Appeal recently endorsed the wide interpretation given to the term “means” in s. 15.2 (4) of the Divorce Act, by Cory J. in Strang v. Strang, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 112, 39 R.F.L. (3rd) 233 at para. 15:
… this interpretation of “means” is consistent with the historical interpretation of the term as including all pecuniary resources, capital assets, income from employment or earning capacity and other sources from which the person receives gains or benefits.
[129] The concept of “needs” in this context is acknowledged to be a relative and flexible one. It is not necessarily fully addressed when the applicant-spouse achieves a subsistence level or any level of income that surpasses subsistence: Myers v Myers, 1995 17 R.F.L. (4th) 298, 65 B.C.A.C. 226.
[130] There is case authority to the effect that if the payor’s ability to pay warrants it, the interim order should permit the applicant to continue living at the same standard of living enjoyed before separation: Robles v. Kuhn, 2009 BCSC 1163 (Master). There is also authority for the proposition that imputing income, which necessitates an assessment of income, earning capacity and opportunities, is not suitable on an interim application, unless there are exceptional circumstances: Nankivell v. Nankivell, 2002 BCSC 778; Campbell v. Campbell, 2008 BCSC 154.
[131] The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (the “SSAG”) are acknowledged as being a useful tool in determining the quantum of interim support. Absent exceptional circumstances that indicate otherwise, interim support should be ordered in the range suggested by the SSAG: Ladd v. Ladd, 2006 BCSC 1280; Beauregard v. Beauregard, 2014 BCSC 1188.
Don’t Delay In Getting Vancouver Interim Spousal Support Legal Advice
Vancouver interim spousal support lawyer Lorne MacLean, QC can help you at an early stage but pre-planning and proper preparation is crucial for a sound and just result. Delay and procrastination is harmful to your family law case and most particularly your Vancouver interim spousal support case.
All to often people hope things will get better or simply do not want to rock the boat on the issue of Vancouver interim spousal support. Other times people play the martyr and take too little or worse still waive their crucial Vancouver interim spousal support rights. Conversely, some paying spouses who are hurt or guilty want to overpay Vancouver interim spousal support hoping this will lead to reconciliation. You need to pay or obtain a fair and sustainable amount of spousal support AFTER you know your Vancouver interim spousal support rights and obligations.
