Surrey Spousal Support Variation Lawyers deal with family law cases that establish the starting amount of spousal support. Surrey Spousal Support Variation Lawyers also handle variations or changes to BC spousal support. In today’s blog, Gurdeep Randhawa of our Surrey office explains how Surrey spousal support variations work.
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A variation of spousal support involves the threshold requirement of a material change in circumstances whereas a review of spousal support is more like an initial application. When negotiatiating spousal support, it is critical you know whether a review or a variation is what is going to happen moving forward.
In cases involving spousal support variations clients ask us: Does spousal support get extended if its quantum (the monthly amount payable) is reduced? A recent British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in Klann v. Klann, 2018 BCCA 48 discussed this topic. For general info on spousal support variations read this.
What happens when a material change of circumstances is found on part of the payor spouse, and the quantum of spousal support payable is reduced? The British Columbia Court of Appeal stated that just because support is reduced the duration is not automatically to be increased – the Court affirmed that there is no automatic requirement that the duration spousal support must be lengthened if its quantum is reduced.
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In Klann v. Klann, 2018 BCCA 48, the Appellant wife challenged the chambers judge’s order varying the amount of spousal support payable by the Respondent husband under a previous Consent Order. The amount of spousal support payable to the wife was reduced in quantum (the monthly amount payable).
The wife claimed that the judge erred in law in varying the quantum of support while not adjusting its duration to extend the time spousal support was paid. The court found that the chambers judge committed no error in finding that a material change in circumstances occurred, thereby reducing the amount of spousal support payable to the Appellant wife, based on the uncontested affidavit evidence of the respondent and others. The court stated that the judge considered the relevant provisions under the Divorce Act and did not err in limiting the variation to amount of support, the only factor impacted by the material change.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal stated that:
[69] As Mr. Klann says, Ms. Jasmer is wrong to treat quantum and duration of spousal support as interdependent. While they are conceptually linked under the SSAG, there is no support for Ms. Jasmer’s argument that a decrease in quantum must automatically lead to an increase in duration. There is no sliding scale requirement. Rather, the correct approach is to adjust spousal support having regard to the respective factors underlying the amount and duration calculations. In this case, the material change in circumstances, namely Mr. Klann’s sale of his interest in Phoenix and the corresponding loss of dividend income, informed only the amount. The judge did not err in adjusting the amount of spousal support while maintaining the duration contemplated in the 2011 consent order.
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In agreeing with the Respondent, Mr. Klann’s factum the British Columbia Court of Appeal outlined that:
[70] The factors underlying amount and duration of support are different. In the with child support, shared parenting formula, the amount of support is calculated based on the net incomes of both parents, with a goal of ensuring that the children of the marriage live in households with similar net disposable income. Duration, on the other hand, is calculated based on the length of marriage and the length of the remaining child-rearing period. (See SSAG, ss. 8.3, 8.5 & 8.6)
The chambers judge’s decision limited his variation to amount because the material change in circumstances went to the net disposable income of the husband’s household. There was no change to the length of marriage nor the child-rearing period. In so limiting the variation, the chambers judge refrained from approaching the parties’ circumstances denovo, instead making only a variation justified by the material change. (See L.M.P. at para. 47, per Abella and Rothstein JJ.)
Had the chambers judge chosen to extend the duration of support, he would have been ignoring the range for duration, making the support award effectively contrary to the SSAG. His decision to maintain a support award that fell within the recommended ranges should be approached with deference. (See Domirti at para. 48).
